The 2003 criminal justice act allows the admittance of evidence against a person for a bad character during the criminal process. The new law was enforced in 2004 succeeding the previous common law and many of the statutory regulations that governed the bad character admissibility which was abolished following these changes. The new scheme that replaced them sets out conditions in which such evidence can be put into use in criminal procedures (Denis 2002)
The new statute seems to have sent back the position in DPP v P. it would seem that the law disregards the attempt to keep away from inclination evidence following DPP. These changes have been manifested so much in the period after 1999 in cases like R v Humphris (2005), R v Nguyen (2005) and R v Black. Nonetheless, it’s evident that that criminal cat of 2003 discards some of the cases like an instance of the case of New South Wales Makin V Attorney-General-(Roberts & Zuckerman 2004).
According to Lord Herschell, the crown was unable to adduce evidence and was inclined to indicate that the accused was guilty of other criminal acts part from those implicated by the indictment for the reasons of drawing conclusions that he is a person likely from the previous criminal record to have committed the felony for which he was to be tried. This outlawed line of thinking prevented the crown from putting up arguments the defendant was guilty based on his general predisposition to commit comparable types of felonies (Denis 2002).