The .distribution .based logistics did not function smoothly, as it .was expected .when the US .group .went to Iraqi for the first time (Peltz, Halliday, and Girardini, 2005). .Variety of problems needed to be addressed and they included insufficient logistics employees, reduced asset visibility, lack of proper communication, and inadequate provision of transportation materials. Although, with time the Army has persistently continued to .change .the .supply .process .and has advanced the materials used so that the .distribution .based logistics system can .become .more successful.
It was .evident .that when operation Iraqi freedom begun, the department of defense did not have the .supply .capability .to set up and .manage .the majority of .distribution .and tools in theater. The .principal .factor that led to the issues of .distribution .in the operation Iraqi freedom was insufficient war service maintaining staff in the theater. Most of the units in the .war .service .sustenance .are reserved .and, therefore, need almost 90 to 120 days to activate and .deploy .the operation Iraqi freedom. To .prevent .the .training .division over the December 2002 festive season, the .conclusion .was decided .so that there is a delay in some of the recruitment of operation Iraqi freedom (Amaal and Judi, 2007). .Because of this reason, majority of the army and the .aquatic .service logistics staff, did not .prepare .to the theater till the time when the .warfare .troops entered and the significant .warfare .operations were in progress.
At the time, when the .warfare .service maintaining staffs were in the theater, defense supply of food and extra parts in .various .units .were exhausted .and meals that were .ready .for .consumption .stocks in the maintaining storehouse were not as much for the day in the operation Iraqi freedom. .This led to the crippling beginning of the .distribution .based logistics system