“Drawing a Line in the Taiwan Strait

Pinsker, Roy (2003). “Drawing a Line in the Taiwan Strait: ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ and itsDiscontents.” Australian Journal of International Affairs. 57:2, 353-368.Many China watchers have long debated about the cost and benefits U.S. security policytowards Taiwan. Successive presidents have followed a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity,’which makes it unclear what the United States would do if some kind of military conflictbreaks out between Taiwan and the PRC. Some believe that President Bush’s recentpolicies break with existing norms. The policy of ‘strategic ambiguity has served as aneffective conflict mechanism in the past and helped avert problems during the 1995-96crisis. He stated that he would do whatever it took to defend Taiwan a few months aftertaking office. Other people in the administration have similar views. The strategicambiguity policy provided dual deterrence. Now Taiwan is in increasing danger.The Quadrennial Defense Review stated that defending friends of the US was a corecommitment. E. Asia has been upgraded as a security concern. New forward deployedforces on Guam and elsewhere shows the importance of this new commitment. The 2002National Security Strategy also identify mention the US commitment to Taiwan. The UShas mentioned that Taiwan should come under the US defense umbrella if Chinacontinued to increase its missile capabilities.These actions are major shifts from the US stand on the issue since 1979. The US bothacknowledges a commitment to Taiwan while maintaining its one China policy. The UShas allowed this ambiguity to continue in order to improve relations with the PRC. TheTWA is ambiguous regarding what the US might do to protect Taiwan. It does notprescribe specific responses to PRC actions. This approach allows the US to be veryflexible in its relations with the two parties. Its main goal is to maintain the status quo.US policy ‘acts on the one hand to frustrate the PRC’s objective of reunifying China butat the same time also ensuring that China is not formally, and perhaps permanentlyseparated. Current policy destroys this balancing act and is seen by the PRC as beingprovocative and could lead them to take more aggressive steps in the future.Some say that the 1995-96 crisis showed that the ambiguous policy was hurting Taiwan’ssecurity. Since Taiwan has become democratic, it becomes increasingly more difficult toignore its security. They stated that the US should be more openly supportive of Taiwan’ssecurity.Past crisis show that the ambiguous policy has allowed all sides enough flexibility andnegotiating room to allow all sides to make face saving pull backs from the brink of war.1954-1955 Taiwan Strait crisis. The US provided rhetorical support for KMT calls forreunification. US naval activity led Mao to think that the US was actually going toinvade. So, Mao started shelling of Quemoy. The US responded by signing a formaldefense agreement with the KMT. The US said this would neutralize the situation in thestrait, but they did not promise to defend the islands. This discouraged the KMT to takeaction and showed Mao that the US would not move to attack mainland Taiwan. Bothsides eventually backed down. The Soviets provided little support to China on the issue.1958 Taiwan Strait CrisisThe KMT moved to get the US to attack the PRC. It interpreted the US statements asstating that they clearly committed the US to support Jinmen and Matsu. He deployedmore troops, making them more ‘crucial’ to Taiwan’s security. The US did discuss plansto deploy nuclear missiles on Taiwan, was the main reason for the crisis. This policychanged the status quo and created a clear two china’s policy which pushed Mao tobombard Jinmen. The US sent warships into the area to protect re-supply vessels, but herefused to approve a KMT attack against PRC artillery batteries. The US also pulled backthe nuclear threat. China responded with restraint. Mao, however, used the anti-USrhetoric to mobilize nationalistic support for the GLF. Also, the soviets showed theirunwillingness to get involved in a civil war between the two sides. The US also moved tobring stability to the long term relationship through the promulgation of a policy of‘neutralization.’ The KMT withdrew most of its forces and the PRC bombardment waslimited to odd numbered days.1995-1996 CrisisDuring the 1995-1996 crisis was brought about by PRC concern with increasing supportfor Lee and Taiwan by allowing him to visit the US. It was very embarrassing for thePRC. This action broke a 25 year precedent of not allowing such visits. So, the PRCresponded with coercive diplomacy. Jiang was thought to have directly overseen theexercises. It tried to intimidate the Taiwanese people to reject Lee. The US stated that itdid not know what it would do in the case of an invasion, and then sailed the 7th fleet intothe strait. The PRC was not intimidated, believing that the US cared more about LosAngeles than Taipei. Live fire exercises were commenced. The Taiwanese were notintimidated and elected Lee. Then the exercises ended. At no time had the US clearlypromised to defend Taiwan. Both actions were of a small enough scale that they allowedboth sides to save face without leading to an escalation of tensions. Both sides had showntheir desire to avoid conflict. The PRC has been distinctly reactive to US and Taiwaninterests. It has repeatedly shown a desire to avoid major conflict. Now Bush’s newpolicy has brought imbalance to this relationship and invites PRC counteractions (massmilitary buildup).